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Beyond Kyoto: North-South Implications of
Emissions Trading and Taxes
Kristen Sheeran1

As scientific evidence of the human causes and consequences of global
climate change mounts, there is renewed urgency to reduce global
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases responsible for
climate change.2

One of the most significant political-environmental

debates surrounding climate change involves the participation of developing
countries in international climate control efforts.

At the heart of this

controversy lies the preferential treatment afforded to developing countries
by the Kyoto Protocol, the prevailing international treaty on climate change.
Critics allege that the Kyoto Protocol prioritized equity for developing
countries at the expense of efficiency in international climate control, and as
a result, failed to elicit the level of international cooperation necessary to
prevent potentially catastrophic climate change.3 Implicit in this critique is
an assumption, common within the mainstream of the economics
profession, that equity and efficiency are separable issues.4 In this paper, I
argue that this assumption has falsely framed the debate over the
participation of developing countries in international climate control as an
either/or phenomenon: either the Kyoto Protocol sacrifices efficiency in the
pursuit of equity by exempting developing countries from mandatory
emissions limits, or it improves efficiency by eliminating special
exemptions for these countries.
I argue that a critical rethinking of the relationship between equity and
efficiency in global climate control is long overdue. As the international
community embarks on the next round of climate negotiations and debates
the role of developing countries in global climate control efforts, clarifying
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the tradeoffs between equity and efficiency takes on renewed importance. I
argue that it is possible to improve efficiency in global climate control
without sacrificing equity for developing countries. A climate control treaty
that is efficient will shift more emissions abatement to the South, where
many countries have lower cost options for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions than in the North. A climate control treaty that is equitable will
shift more of the costs of emissions reduction to the North, where the
countries most responsible for climate change and most able to pay to
prevent climate change are located.

Therefore, to improve equity and

efficiency in international climate control, mechanisms for locating
emissions reduction in the South while distributing the resulting costs to the
North need to be further explored. Ironically, emissions taxes and trading,
what the mainstream of the economics profession hails as “market friendly”
mechanisms, can be used to shift abatement to the South while
redistributing the cost to the North. Typically, economists emphasize the
cost-savings associated with these mechanisms, preferring to treat the
efficiency of these mechanisms separately from equity.5

I argue that

emissions taxes and trading should be more fully incorporated in global
climate control efforts if policy makers maintain their commitment to
fairness for developing countries in climate control and use these
mechanisms deliberately to reduce North-South inequalities.
In Section I of this paper, I explain the special relationship between
equity and efficiency in the case of climate control and other global public
goods and highlight the challenges for policy makers. In Section II, I
describe the history of international climate control efforts thus far, with
particular attention to how a commitment to fairness for developing
countries may have limited the potential efficiency of these efforts. In
Section III, I introduce emissions taxes and trading as potential mechanisms
for improving the efficiency of international climate control efforts and
demonstrate how these mechanisms can be used deliberately to reduce
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North-South inequalities. In Section IV, I conclude with my prediction of
the direction global climate control negotiations will likely take.

I. EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Understanding the relationship between equity and efficiency in climate
control and its implications for policy makers is complicated by the fact that
climate control is a global public good.6 Because greenhouse gases are
transboundary pollutants that yield the same impact on global climate
regardless of where they are produced, reducing greenhouse gases in any
one country, to the extent that it mitigates the threat of global climate
change, generates a public good benefit for all countries. Economists have
long demonstrated the fundamental problem with public goods: there is
insufficient incentive for any one individual to provide them.7 In the case of
climate change, individual countries are reluctant to incur the costs of
emissions abatement if other countries benefit at their expense. Rather, the
rational strategy for any one country is to “free-ride” on the emissions
abatement of others. A country will only voluntarily reduce its emissions if
its own private benefit from emissions reduction outweighs its own cost.
However, this level of abatement is less than optimal from a global
perspective.

Because every unit of emissions reduction benefits all

countries, the global benefit from any one country’s emissions reduction
likely exceeds its cost. A country that voluntarily reduces emissions incurs
the entire cost of its abatement but captures only a fraction of the total
global benefit it creates.

Because the demand for global emissions

reduction is greater than any one individual country’s demand for emissions
reduction, each country abates less than what is globally optimal.
The implication of the public good problem for international climate
control is clear: international cooperation is necessary to achieve the
optimal level of global emissions abatement. Absent cooperation, countries
will choose abatement levels on the basis of their own private costs and
benefits, ignoring the greater global benefit their abatement provides. An
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international climate control agreement can overcome the “free-rider”
problem and achieve the optimal level of global emissions abatement.
For economists, the optimal, or efficient, level of global emissions
abatement is the level that maximizes the net global benefit from emissions
abatement.8 Economists would describe an international climate control
treaty as “efficient” if it satisfies two conditions. First, it must guarantee
that individual countries reduce emissions sufficiently such that the optimal
global level of emissions abatement is achieved.9 Second, the treaty must
minimize the cost to individual countries of reducing their emissions to
ensure that the optimal level of global abatement is achieved at the lowest
possible global cost. The total global cost of abatement is minimized when
the cost of the last unit of emissions reduction in any one country, the
marginal cost, is the same for all countries.10 For example, if the last unit of
emissions abatement in country X exceeded the cost of the last unit of
abatement in country Y, shifting abatement from X (the country with the
higher marginal abatement cost) to Y (the country with the lower marginal
abatement cost) would lower the total global cost of emissions abatement.
For this reason, an efficient climate control treaty will equalize marginal
abatement costs among all countries.

An inefficient treaty will either

produce too little global abatement and/or fail to produce that level of
global abatement at the lowest possible total global cost.
Three problems arise for policy makers charged with designing an
efficient climate control treaty.11 First, not all countries may benefit equally
from climate control. Second, equalizing marginal abatement costs among
countries may mean that some countries—countries that can abate
emissions at comparatively lower cost—will abate much more than others.
These two possibilities suggest that some countries will benefit more from
participating in an efficient treaty, whereas other countries could potentially
be worse off for their participation.12 Countries anticipating lower climate
change related damages, and/or countries with relatively low abatement
costs, will derive a lower (or negative) net benefit from an efficient treaty
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than countries who benefit more from preventing climate change and whose
relatively high abatement costs mean they have to abate less.13 Therefore,
differences in countries’ abatement costs and benefits are significant,
because for an international climate control agreement to be self-enforcing,
all sovereign countries must find it in their self-interests to voluntarily
participate.14
The third problem policy makers confront in designing an efficient
climate control treaty is that not all countries are equally responsible for the
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that is driving climate
change.15 Nor do all countries demonstrate equal ability to pay for the costs
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.16 For equity reasons, policy makers
may want to shift the burden of emissions reduction more heavily to those
countries that share greater responsibility for climate change and can better
afford abatement.17 If satisfying these equity concerns requires shifting
abatement from low-cost, high-benefiting countries to high-cost, lowbenefiting countries, the treaty will fail to elicit sufficient participation, and
it will fail to minimize the total global cost of mitigating climate change.18
The treaty will produce too little global abatement at too high a global cost.
I argue that these problems that policy makers confront in designing an
efficient and equitable climate control treaty are not intractable, though their
existence predictably complicates negotiations.19 As compared to a noncooperative, non-treaty outcome where countries choose abatement levels
independently of each other, an efficient climate control treaty can increase
global abatement to optimal levels and reduce the global cost of achieving
that abatement. The change from a non-cooperative outcome to an efficient
treaty can produce benefits in excess of costs, i.e., an efficiency gain.
Generating this efficiency gain means that an efficient treaty can make all
countries better off. Whether or not an efficient treaty actually renders
every country better off will depend on how that efficiency gain is
distributed among countries.
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To ensure that the efficiency gain from an efficient international climate
control treaty is distributed fairly among countries, I argue that it is
necessary to distinguish between where abatement takes place and who
pays for it.

Mechanisms such as emissions trading and taxes can

accomplish this. These mechanisms can be used to lower the costs of
global emissions abatement and to fairly distribute the costs and benefits of
global abatement among countries. I argue that using emissions trading and
taxes as deliberate means of fairly distributing the costs and benefits of
global climate control is a better approach than the current approach of
exempting developing countries from emissions quotas. Both mechanisms,
deemed “market-friendly” alternatives to a “command-and-control”
regulatory approach by mainstream economists, can be used to improve
efficiency

in

international

climate

control

without

necessarily

20

compromising fairness for developing countries.

II. INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CONTROL EFFORTS
Examining the history of international climate control sheds valuable
light on the deficiencies of the prevailing approach to mitigating climate
change and illuminates an alternative path for future policy makers to take.
Attempts to forge international cooperation on mitigating climate change
began in 1992 with the United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCC) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.21 At that time, the participating
industrialized countries agreed to voluntarily reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions.22 However, the need to strengthen the UNFCC soon became
evident as most of the industrialized countries failed to meet their voluntary
targets and emissions in some countries actually increased.23 More than one
hundred and fifty countries convened in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 to negotiate
binding emissions quotas.24 The product of those negotiations, the Kyoto
Protocol, remains the prevailing international agreement on combating
climate change to date.
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The

Kyoto

Protocol

establishes

binding

emissions

limits

for

industrialized countries and a range of mechanisms to promote costeffective compliance. Following the framework of the UNFCC, the Kyoto
Protocol differentiates between two groups of countries worldwide:
“Annex I” countries, which are subject to emissions limits, and “non-Annex
I” countries, which have no binding commitments. The list of non-Annex I
countries consists of developing countries. The list of Annex I countries is
comprised of thirty-nine industrialized countries and countries with
economies in transition.25 These countries account for two-thirds of global
carbon emissions.26 The United States alone, accounting for less than 5
percent of the world’s population, produces 25 percent of global carbon
emissions.27

Although individual country commitments vary, Annex I

countries, on average, are required to reduce emissions by 5.2 percent of
their 1990 emissions levels during the commitment period from 20082012.28
Policy makers confronted three challenges in designing the Kyoto
Protocol. First, in keeping with the original UNFCC mandate, they were to
establish emissions targets compatible with stabilizing greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at levels that would prevent catastrophic
human-induced climate change.29

Second, to improve efficiency and

increase the willingness of countries to participate, policy makers needed to
include mechanisms such as emissions trading to minimize the costs to
countries of meeting their targets.30 Lastly, to address historical imbalance
in greenhouse gas production and differences in countries’ abilities to pay
for abatement, policy makers had to distribute the costs of preventing
climate change equitably among countries.31
It can be argued that the Kyoto Protocol represents a truly remarkable
and unprecedented example of the willingness of the global community to
prioritize fairness for developing countries in an international agreement.
Equity concerns motivated a climate control framework that assigned
countries

differentiated

responsibilities

for

reducing

emissions

in
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recognition of their ability to pay and their historic contribution to the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.32 But what price, if any, did the
international community pay for this commitment to fairness?
The most immediate implication of the Kyoto Protocol’s exemption of
developing countries is that developing countries lack direct incentives to
limit their emissions. This is especially problematic given the predicted rate
of emissions increase in these countries in the near future.33 As long as
developing countries can ignore the negative external effects of their
emissions production on global climate, emissions production in developing
countries will exceed optimal levels.34 By imposing limits on developed
countries, however insufficient those levels may prove to be in preventing
climate change, the Kyoto Protocol imputed a cost to emissions in
developed countries that is (theoretically) accounted for in decisions
regarding emissions activity. For every ton of emissions they produce,
developed countries must either pay to offset those emissions in order to
meet their Kyoto targets, or forgo the revenues they could have earned from
selling emissions reduction credits to other countries.35 The Kyoto Protocol
ensures that every ton of emissions produced in the developed world has an
implicit price attached to it. Whether that price is sufficiently high to
capture the full global cost of emissions is an important point worth
debating and one that speaks to the overall efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol.
However, it is clear that as long as developing countries are exempt from
emissions quotas the Kyoto Protocol cannot achieve the optimal level of
global abatement.
The second implication of exempting developing countries from
mandatory emissions quotas is that the Kyoto Protocol concentrates
abatement in the areas of the world where abatement may cost most.
Marginal abatement costs typically increase with the level of emissions
abatement.36 Countries exhaust least-cost options for reducing emissions
first, such that subsequent abatements cost increasingly more. Developed
countries, because they have engaged in more emissions abatement on
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average than developing countries, tend to exhibit higher marginal
abatement costs.37
In addition, some of the least-cost methods for reducing emissions stem
from forest resources that are relatively more abundant in the developing
world. Forests sequester carbon emissions from the atmosphere and store
the carbon long-term in vegetation and soils.

Land use change that

contributes to deforestation reduces carbon sequestration and releases stored
carbon back into the atmosphere.38 Restoring, expanding, or preserving
forest areas are effective means for mitigating climate change.39

The

relatively low opportunity costs of protecting and expanding tropical forests
would make this an attractive abatement option for many developing
countries if the Kyoto Protocol provided these countries with incentives to
offset their emissions.40
To minimize the total global cost of emissions abatement, the Kyoto
Protocol would have needed to allocate abatement across countries to
equalize countries’ marginal abatement costs. If marginal abatement costs
are lower in developing countries, efficiency should have required the
Kyoto Protocol to shift more abatement activity to the developing world.
The problem, of course, was that shifting abatement to developing countries
violated the international community’s commitment to fairness in climate
control. The Kyoto Protocol concentrates abatement in the developed world
instead, despite the fact that global abatement costs are likely higher as a
result.

By exempting developing countries from mandatory emissions

limits, the Kyoto Protocol increased the cost of global climate control and
diminished the incentive of other countries to participate.

Simulations

reveal that the highest net global benefits from climate control manifest
under scenarios that include the full participation of both developing and
developed countries, and where international emissions trading ensures that
emissions activity is concentrated in the countries where it costs least.41
The most significant problem with the Kyoto Protocol, however, is that it
fails to generate sufficient abatement to prevent climate change. The United
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States dealt a potentially lethal blow to international climate control efforts
with its decision in 2001 to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol after years of
active negotiating to shape the treaty’s framework in its own best interests.42
The United States cited the lack of participation of developing countries and
the resulting high cost-to-benefit ratio of the Kyoto Protocol as its primary
reason for withdrawal.43 To enter into force, the Kyoto Protocol required
ratification by at least 55 countries representing at least 55 percent of
emissions in the developed world. Without the United States, which is the
world’s largest emissions producer, implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
required the participation of almost every other developed country. When
the Kyoto Protocol finally entered into force in February 2005, it included
161 nations representing 62 percent of developed country emissions. On
average, these nations will reduce their emissions by 5.2 percent from their
1990 levels.44
According to most climate scientists, an effective solution to climate
change will require more emissions reduction than the Kyoto Protocol
requires during its initial 2008–2012 commitment period.45 If net emissions
from human sources remain at current levels, atmospheric concentrations
will soon climb to roughly twice their preindustrial levels.46 Stabilizing
atmospheric concentrations at their current levels would require an
immediate 50–70 percent reduction in global emissions and further
reductions thereafter.47 Stabilizing atmospheric concentrations at current
levels would only limit the increase in average global temperature to
3.5 Celsius degrees or less by the year 2100.48 The Kyoto Protocol, though
it is an important first step toward mitigating climate change, cannot
prevent climate change.
The international community has already begun the next stage of climate
negotiations. In December 2005, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol met in
Montreal to plan for emissions reduction beyond Kyoto’s initial 2008–2012
commitment period.49 During the next commitment period, more extensive
reductions, upwards of 30–60 percent, will have to be achieved.50 The
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participation of the United States is absolutely critical in this regard.
However, inducing cooperation from the United States will likely prove to
be the most difficult problem for international climate negotiators to solve.
Negotiators will also have to grapple with developing countries, and
whether exemptions for equity reasons should continue to be granted in this
next round of climate action.

If the potential efficiency loss from

exemptions undermines the effectiveness of global climate control efforts,
the issue becomes one of whether equity for developing countries can be
achieved through means other than exemptions.

III. BEYOND KYOTO: EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY RECONSIDERED
Mainstream economics has falsely framed the debate over the
participation of developing countries in international climate control as an
either/or phenomenon: either a climate control treaty sacrifices efficiency
to achieve fairness for developing countries by exempting developing
countries from mandatory emissions limits, or it sacrifices equity to
improve efficiency by eliminating such preferential treatment. Efficiency in
global climate control requires two things: (1) that all countries internalize
the external costs of their emissions such that the optimal level of global
abatement is achieved, and (2) that the global cost of achieving optimal
abatement is minimized by distributing abatement to the countries where it
costs least.51 These efficiency conditions imply that not only should limits
be placed on developing countries’ emissions, but that global abatement
should be centered in the developing world because of its comparatively
lower abatement costs. The global community is right to reject such an
outcome as grossly unfair if further mechanisms are not put in place to
redistribute the costs of abatement from developing countries to developed
countries.

The issue of where abatement takes place in the world is

separable from the issue of who pays for it. Where abatement takes place is
largely an efficiency issue. Who pays for abatement is an issue of fairness.
In the case of global climate control, equity and efficiency are not separable
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issues. An international climate control treatment can be both fair and
efficient if the appropriate redistributive mechanisms are implemented.
Emissions trading and emissions taxes can improve efficiency in
international climate control without necessarily compromising fairness for
developing countries. An emissions tax charges emissions producers a fee
equivalent to the marginal damage of their emissions for every unit of
emissions they produce.52 Emissions trading requires emissions producers
to obtain a permit in order to emit. The total amount of emissions is capped
by the number of permits issued and producers are allowed to buy and sell
permits among themselves as they deem necessary.53

Mainstream

economics treat emissions taxes and emissions trading as theoretical
equivalents in terms of efficiency.54 Both mechanisms can achieve the
socially desirable level of emissions reduction by forcing emissions
producers to internalize the external costs of their emissions.55 Whether
producers are required to pay a tax equal to the marginal damage of their
emissions, or producers are required to obtain an emissions permit with a
price equal to the marginal damage of their emissions, the penalty for
emitting and the producer’s incentive to reduce emissions is the same.56
Moreover, both mechanisms can lower the costs of reducing emissions in
comparison to a standard regulatory approach.57

Regulations typically

mandate that emissions producers adopt a specific technology to reduce
emissions (e.g., scrubbers), or mandate that all producers reduce their
emissions by a certain percentage.58 While this approach should produce
the socially desired level of emissions reduction, it often inflates costs by
failing to account for differences in abatement costs between different
producers and technologies. In comparison, emissions taxes and emissions
trading introduce more flexibility to help insure that the least-cost methods
for reducing emissions are adopted.59 Producers who can find ways to abate
emissions at a relatively low cost will reduce emissions to avoid the more
costly emissions tax or tradable permit price. Producers who can reduce
emissions at a relatively high cost will pay the tax or obtain a permit to

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF FREE TRADE

Beyond Kyoto 709

avoid more costly abatement activities.60 Mainstream economists typically
prefer emissions taxes and emissions trading over regulation because they
can produce the same level of abatement as regulation at a potentially lower
cost.61
While emissions taxes and trading may be equivalent in many respects,
they differ significantly in their distributional consequences. Emissions
taxes adhere to the principle that the “polluter pays,” which means that
those responsible for generating societal costs are required to pay for the
damages.62 Not only is this deemed fair by most in society, but it is also
efficient in that it provides the right incentives to producers to minimize the
social costs of their production. An emissions trading scheme could be
designed in such a way that the polluter also pays, but this is neither
required in theory nor common in practice.63 Whether or not the polluter
pays under an emissions trading scheme depends on the initial allocation of
the permits.64 When permits are sold to emissions producers, emissions
producers pay for the right to emit and this payment theoretically
compensates for the damages caused by their emissions. When permits are
sold to emissions producers, they force the polluter to pay and their
distributive effects are equivalent to taxes.65
Permits, however, can be awarded for free to emissions producers.66 In
this case, polluters are granted the right to emit pollutants up to a certain
level while the public essentially surrenders its right to fair compensation
for harms generated by the emissions. For mainstream economists trained
to prioritize efficiency over equity, the distributional differences between
permits and taxes are inconsequential, for even when permits are awarded
for free, permits theoretically provide the same incentives to reduce
emissions as taxes as long as the permits are tradable.67 An emissions
producer who is awarded free permits can always sell those permits to
another emissions producer. By emitting, producers forego the lost revenue
they could have earned from the sale of their permits to other producers.
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This theoretically provides an incentive to lower emissions to even those
producers who are awarded permits for free.68
A. Emissions Trading
The structure and design of the Kyoto Protocol embodies many of the
principles of an emissions trading scheme.

The Kyoto Protocol is

essentially an emissions trading scheme whereby the rights to emit at the
levels specified by individual country quotas were awarded freely. Though
proponents of the Kyoto Protocol are often hesitant to portray it in this way,
what the Kyoto Protocol did was create and award property rights over the
atmospheric commons. The initial assignment of emissions rights under the
Kyoto Protocol determined the distribution of the net benefits from the
treaty’s implementation. The right to produce a certain level of emissions
without penalty is highly valued, especially if that right can be sold to other
countries. If emissions rights are transferable, countries can choose to meet
their emissions target by reducing emissions or by purchasing those rights
from other countries. As long as marginal abatement costs are different
between countries, countries with lower marginal abatement costs will have
an incentive to reduce emissions and sell their unused rights to countries
with relatively higher marginal abatement costs. The more emissions rights
granted to countries, the more countries can benefit from a climate control
treaty that allows them to sell those rights to other countries.
Hence, the initial allocation of emissions rights becomes an important
tool for redistributing the net benefits from global climate control. This tool
can be wielded in more or less equitable ways. However, by exempting
developing countries from mandatory emissions limits, the Kyoto Protocol
granted developing countries unlimited property rights to the global
atmospheric commons. The exemptions created an undeniable windfall
gain to developing countries, which could benefit from the emissions
abatement of other countries without paying for any of the cost. Had the
rights awarded to developing countries been fully transferable, the benefits
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to developing countries would have been greater even still. However, the
Kyoto Protocol limited trade in emissions rights, thereby lowering the value
of those rights granted to developing countries.
The Kyoto Protocol does allow for emissions trading between developed
countries and does not specify an explicit limit on the use of emissions
trading to satisfy countries’ commitments.69 In an implicit way, however,
the use of emissions trading is limited by the requirement that domestic
action constitutes a “significant element” of a country’s emissions reduction
efforts.70 The clear intent of the Kyoto Protocol is that countries cannot
meet their entire emissions target with permits purchased abroad.
Emissions trading is extended to developing countries through the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM).71 The CDM allows developed countries
to receive “credits” towards their own emissions quotas for financing
projects that reduce emissions in developing countries.72 CDM projects can
also be unilateral, such that developing countries undertake CDM projects
on their own without an explicit developed country partner and market the
resulting emissions credits themselves.73

The essential requirement for

CDM projects is that they reduce emissions below what would have
occurred in the absence of that particular CDM project.74 For this reason,
extending CDM credit to forest conservation and reforestation in
developing countries is problematic. It would require establishing reliable
baselines for forest cover in developing countries with which to gauge the
additionality

of

CDM

forestry-based

activities—a

difficult

task.75

Accordingly, the application of CDM credits to forestry-based emissions
reduction activity in the developing world is limited to only 1 percent of a
country’s emissions target in any given year.
The Kyoto Protocol limits the transferability of rights to the global
commons by limiting the use of emissions trading and the CDM. Concerns
that emissions trading and the CDM could allow countries like the United
States to escape the burden of costly emissions reduction and forestall the
transition away from fossil fuels prompted the Kyoto Protocol’s current
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limitation on emissions trading. The efficiency loss associated with the
exemption of developing countries from emissions quotas stems not from
the transfer of property rights to developing countries for equity reasons,
but because those property rights are not fully transferable. As long as
developing countries are awarded unlimited property rights, as they are
currently by the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries could benefit more
from unlimited emissions trading.

Allowing unlimited trading could

increase the demand for low-cost abatement options in developed countries,
thereby facilitating more investment in emissions abatement in the
developing world. It could provide incentives to developing countries to
reduce emissions, as every ton of emissions produced would imply foregone
earnings from the sale of emissions credits. Accordingly, full emissions
trading can improve the efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol and benefit
developing countries, provided the initial allocation of property rights
continues to favor developing countries. This is ironic given that the usual
arguments for extending emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol cite
the potential cost-savings for developed (not developing) countries and that
objections to full emissions trading have been waged on these grounds.
Moving forward beyond Kyoto, using full emissions trading to the
benefit of developing countries will depend on two things. First, it will
depend on the initial allocation of rights to the atmospheric commons. If
exemptions are still granted to developing countries, they will have nothing
to lose but something to gain from emissions trading. Exemptions cast
developing countries in the role of seller, not buyer. Second, it will depend
on the price paid by developed countries for the emissions rights developing
countries sell. The price, in turn, will depend on the extent of emissions
reduction required by the developed world. Consequently, a treaty that
requires more extensive reductions in the developed world will not only be
more successful in preventing climate change, but also will generate a larger
windfall for developing countries.
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The political obstacle, of course, is to convince developed countries to
accept more extensive emissions reductions. It is unlikely that developed
countries, particularly the United States, will agree to more extensive
reductions unless developing countries are required to limit their emissions
growth. In this case, the next stage in international climate negotiations will
likely involve a very different initial allocation of property rights, and the
net benefits to developing countries would be unclear.76

If this is the

direction climate negotiations take over the next decade, explicit
acknowledgement of the distributional consequences of the initial allocation
of emissions rights is crucial if the global community is to retain its current
commitment to fairness for developing countries.
B. Emissions Taxes
If full emissions trading offers a more efficient approach to fairly
distributing the net benefits from global climate control than exemptions for
developing countries, global emissions taxes are better still.

A global

emissions tax can achieve the same emissions abatement as emissions
trading, while providing a more direct and transparent method of income
redistribution.

Emissions taxes also avoid the predictable shortfalls of

imperfect markets for emissions credits. For example, large countries like
the United States could drive up the demand for emissions credits,
effectively pricing them beyond the ability of small countries to afford.
This is problematic, particularly if developing countries are required to
reduce emissions in the future and would have to compete against countries
with significant market power to purchase those rights. Historically, market
mechanisms have worked more to the advantage of developed countries,
and support for global emissions trading should be guarded for this reason
alone.
A global emissions tax adheres to the logic that the polluter pays, thereby
providing the right incentives to all countries to reduce emissions. To
provide the right incentives to developing countries to reduce emissions, the
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global emissions tax would have to apply to developed and developing
countries. If developing countries are exempt from a global emissions tax,
the same inefficiencies that plague the Kyoto Protocol may still remain.
Again, the exemptions would grant unlimited rights to the atmospheric
commons, but unlike in the case of emissions trading, under an emissions
tax scheme, developing countries would have no opportunities to benefit
from the sale of those rights to other countries.
From the perspective of developing countries, this approach is far less
preferable. To maintain the commitment to fairness under an emissions tax
scheme, the revenues from those taxes would have to be recycled back to
the developing world to offset the costs of their participation in global
climate control. Recycling can take the form of technology transfers or
more direct payments. Revenue recycling does not negate the incentive to
abate emissions as long as the amount of revenue recycled back to any one
country is independent of that country’s level of emissions reduction.77
The potential to use global emissions taxes as an alternative to emissions
trading, particularly if revenues are recycled back to developing countries,
may seem politically untenable.

Many have rejected the possibility of

global emissions taxes on this ground. However, the redistributive transfers
implicit in emissions trading schemes generally, and in the Kyoto Protocol
more specifically, are no less potentially objectionable. Not only did the
Kyoto Protocol award a windfall gain to developing countries, but it also
distributed the net benefits from climate control in arbitrary and far less
obvious ways.

For example, by specifying emissions targets as a

percentage of 1990 emissions levels, countries with higher emissions levels
in 1990 benefit more than others. Russia, because its emissions dropped
significantly with the decline in its industrial activity post-1990, is now in a
position to sell its emissions rights to other developed countries.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Kyoto Protocol is remarkable for its explicit commitment to fairness
and the windfall gain it provides to developing countries. This commitment
to fairness, however, is currently jeopardized by the conventional economic
treatment of equity and efficiency as separable issues. Pressure to remove
the exemptions currently granted to developing countries is mounting under
the guise that equity compromises efficiency. If exemptions are removed,
alternative mechanisms must be used to ensure fairness for developing
countries. If market-based mechanisms like emissions trading or taxes play
a greater role in future climate negotiations, as proponents of greater
efficiency in global climate control would like them to, it is imperative that
these mechanisms are used deliberately to distribute the net benefits of
climate control fairly and not just to increase efficiency.

Whatever

direction the next round of global climate negotiations take, advocates for
developing countries should remain clear on the relationship between equity
and efficiency. Beyond Kyoto, it is possible to improve efficiency in global
climate control without sacrificing fairness, as long as the initial distribution
of property rights continues to favor the developing countries.
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